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Evaluating the Singapore Convention Through a U.S.-Centric Litigation Lens:
Lessons Learned from Nearly Two Decades of Mediation Disuputes in American
Federal and State Courts
Abstract
This article compares a recent five-year dataset (2013-2017) on mediation litigation trends with an earlier
dataset (1999-2003) to make some general observations about mediation litigation trends over the last
nineteen years, with a specific focus on enforcement of mediated settlements, the topic addressed by the
Singapore Convention.
Part II of this article provides a general overview of U.S. mediation litigation trends, including a detailed
description of how the databases were created and caveats about their use, a summary of raw numbers,
and a review of the common mediation issues litigated in U.S. Courts. Principal conclusions include the
fact that litigation about mediation has steadily increased between 1999 and 2017, a time period when
new civil filings in state and federal courts have been more or less constant, or in some years declined.
Disputes about enforcement of mediated settlements remain the most commonly litigated topic; however,
disputing about enforcement has significantly declined overall in proportion to all litigated mediation
disputes.
Part III offers a detailed examination of mediated settlement enforcement litigation, including types of
enforcement disputes, defenses to enforcement, the enforcement-confidentiality connection, and
significance of the subject matter of the underlying dispute. Principal conclusions include the fact that
mediated settlements continue to be enforced at a very high rate—68% on average for the 2013–2017
time period. The frequency with which parties raise “traditional” contract defenses such as whether there
was a meeting of the minds or mistake, as well as challenges to fundamental fairness of the process
through fraud or duress, have declined. In their place are a panoply of procedural and jurisdictional
defenses which have increased in number as mediation gets institutionalized in statutes and court rules.
As was true in the original 1999–2003 dataset, cases involving mediator malfeasance are exceedingly
rare, and with a 95% settlement enforcement rate, virtually always a loser for the challenging party.
Surprisingly, cases raising both enforcement defenses and confidentiality issues were far less common in
2013–2017 compared to 1999–2003, and settlement enforcement far more likely in such cases in the
recent time period.
Part IV applies lessons gleaned from the litigation data to evaluate the choices made by the drafters of
the Singapore Convention. From my perspective as a chronicler of “mediations gone bad,” there is much
to praise in the drafters’ efforts.
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EVALUATING THE SINGAPORE CONVENTION
THROUGH A U.S.-CENTRIC LITIGATION
LENS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM
NEARLY TWO DECADES OF
MEDIATION DISPUTES IN AMERICAN
FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
James R. Coben*
I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter assesses the likely efficaciousness of the Singa
pore Mediation Convention1 based on nearly two decades experi
ence of systematically tracking and studying mediation litigation in
the U.S. federal and state courts.
In the Spring of 2006, my colleague Peter N. Thompson and I
authored our first study analyzing our comprehensive five-year
dataset documenting mediation litigation trends from 1999–2003.
The article, entitled Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at Litiga
tion About Mediation,2 made a number of findings relevant to the
Convention, including among others:
• Litigation involving mediation issues increased 95% from
1999 to 2003.3
• Nearly half of all court opinions about mediation ad
dressed enforcement of settlement agreements. Tradi
tional contract defenses, although frequently raised in
enforcement cases, were rarely successful.4
• Very few opinions raised the issue of mediator miscon
duct;5 in fact, only seventeen times in five years did parties
assert a contract defense based on mediator conduct.6
* Professor of Law and Senior Fellow in the Dispute Resolution Institute, Mitchell Hamline
School of Law. The author thanks Caleb Gerbitz, a student at Mitchell Hamline for his thought
ful advice and top-notch technical expertise offered at all stages of this project.
1 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Fiftyfirst session, U.N. Doc. A/73/17, annex I (2018) [hereinafter Singapore Convention].
2 James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at Litigation
About Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 43 (2006).
3 Id. at 47–48.
4 Id. at 48–49.
5 Id.
6 Id.
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• Courts are inclined to order mediation on their own initia
tive and will generally enforce a pre-existing obligation to
participate in mediation, whether the obligation was judi
cially created, mandated by statute, or stipulated in the
parties’ pre-dispute contract.7
• Courts frequently consider evidence of what occurs in me
diation; indeed, in over three hundred opinions courts ad
dressed mediation communications without any mention of
privilege or mediation confidentiality.8
A year later, we published a follow-up article detailing two
additional years of data analysis (2004–2005) and speculating about
future trends.9 Although we then stopped systematically coding
every mediation case for inclusion in a master database, we contin
ued to monitor gross annual counts and squib the years’ most sig
nificant cases for continuing legal education presentations and a
variety of publications,10 including most significantly since 2011, for
our work as co-authors (together with Sarah Cole, Nancy Rogers,
Craig McEwen, and Nadja Alexander) of Mediation: Law, Policy
& Practice, a Thomsen Reuters Trial Practice Series Treatise.11
As Professor Thompson and I wrote back in 2007, “[w]e, of
course, found it ironic and unfortunate that mediation, a process
designed as an alternative to litigation, can, in some circumstances,
encourage rather than eliminate additional litigation.”12 That dis
puting irony continues to the present day, and I continue to believe
that valuable lessons can be learned from mining the data.
The run-up to the December 2018 General Assembly’s ap
proval of the Singapore Convention inspired me to put my mining
7

Id. at 105.
Id. at 58–59.
9 James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Mediation Litigation Trends: 1999-2007, 1 WORLD
ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 395 (2007).
10 See, e.g., James R. Coben, My Change of Mind on the Uniform Mediation Act, 23 DISP.
RESOL. MAG., Winter 2017, at 6; James R. Coben, Barnacles, Aristocracy and Truth Denial:
Three Not So Beautiful Aspects of Contemporary Mediation, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
779 (2015); Sarah R. Cole, Craig A. McEwen, Nancy H. Rogers, James R. Coben & Peter N.
Thompson, Where Mediation is Concerned, Sometimes ‘There Ought Not to Be a Law’!, 20 DISP.
RESOL. MAG., Winter 2014, at 34; James R. Coben, Creating a 21st Century Oligarchy: Judicial
Abdication to Class Action Mediators, 5 PENN. ST. Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 162 (2013); Peter N.
Thompson, Good Faith Mediation in the Federal Courts, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 363
(2011).
11 SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE (2018–2019). The treatise,
updated annually and available online in Westlaw, contains detailed analysis of case law, as well
as statutes and court rules on all of the topics addressed in this article.
12 Coben & Thompson, supra note 9, at 395.
8
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gear back on in earnest. With the assistance of my extremely tal
ented research assistant Caleb Gerbitz, I constructed a new dataset
analyzing litigation about mediation for cases decided in
2013–2017. This article compares the new five-year dataset with
the original 1999–2003 dataset to make some general observations
about mediation litigation trends over the last nineteen years, with
a specific focus on enforcement of mediated settlements, the topic
addressed by the Singapore Convention.
Part II of this article provides a general overview of U.S. medi
ation litigation trends, including a detailed description of how the
databases were created and caveats about their use, a summary of
raw numbers, and a review of the common mediation issues liti
gated in U.S. Courts. Principal conclusions include the fact that liti
gation about mediation has steadily increased between 1999 and
2017, a time period when new civil filings in state and federal
courts have been more or less constant, or in some years declined.
Disputes about enforcement of mediated settlements remain the
most commonly litigated topic; however, disputing about enforce
ment has significantly declined overall in proportion to all litigated
mediation disputes.
Part III offers a detailed examination of mediated settlement
enforcement litigation, including types of enforcement disputes,
defenses to enforcement, the enforcement-confidentiality connec
tion, and significance of the subject matter of the underlying dis
pute. Principal conclusions include the fact that mediated
settlements continue to be enforced at a very high rate—68% on
average for the 2013–2017 time period. The frequency with which
parties raise “traditional” contract defenses such as whether there
was a meeting of the minds or mistake, as well as challenges to
fundamental fairness of the process through fraud or duress, have
declined. In their place are a panoply of procedural and jurisdic
tional defenses which have increased in number as mediation gets
institutionalized in statutes and court rules. As was true in the
original 1999–2003 dataset, cases involving mediator malfeasance
are exceedingly rare, and with a 95% settlement enforcement rate,
virtually always a loser for the challenging party. Surprisingly,
cases raising both enforcement defenses and confidentiality issues
were far less common in 2013–2017 compared to 1999–2003, and
settlement enforcement far more likely in such cases in the more
recent time period.
Part IV applies lessons gleaned from the litigation data to
evaluate the choices made by the drafters of the Singapore Con
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vention. From my perspective as a chronicler of “mediations gone
bad,” there is much to praise in the drafters’ efforts.
First, the U.S. litigation experience strongly supports the Con
vention’s singular focus on enforcement, as well as having minimal
formalities necessary to trigger treaty application. Second, the
drafters’ choice to permit only an opt-out from treaty coverage and
to generally assume that parties will want their agreements to be
enforceable, arguably will maximize application of the treaty and
in turn meet the drafters’ primary goal of promoting the use of
mediation. More important, in light of the recent U.S. litigation
experience showing that procedural and jurisdictional defenses are
becoming more common, the decision not to use an opt-in ap
proach holds promise for significantly reducing post-mediation dis
puting. Third, limiting treaty coverage to cross-border commercial
disputes and explicitly excluding family and consumer matters is
certainly understandable, given an oft-cited concern for power im
balances outside the business-to-business context. However, per
haps somewhat surprisingly, there is no evidence in the U.S.
datasets to suggest that enforcement defenses are generally more
common, or more successful outside the commercial context.
Fourth, the grounds for refusal contained in Article 5 of the Con
vention will most certainly permit the wide range of “traditional”
contract enforcement defenses parties typically raise post-media
tion, but will wisely limit challenges based on domestic law proce
dural arguments and filing formalities, which given the recent U.S.
experience, are an increasing share of enforcement litigation. That
said, there is little in the litigation track record from the United
States to suggest that the grounds for refusal based on mediation
misconduct will be commonly invoked and even if invoked ever
successful. Finally, the drafters made a defensible choice to decline
to legislate mediation confidentiality. While I have in the past
made a strong argument praising the merits of uniformity in confi
dentiality regulation,13 the political reality is that getting agreement
on a single approach to this complex topic (which depending on
jurisdiction and legal culture might involve statutes, court rules, ju
dicial decisions, ethical codes, ADR institutional provider policies,
and/or party contract), would likely take many more years of nego
tiation than the three the drafters devoted to the Singapore
Convention.

13

See Coben, My Change of Mind on the Uniform Mediation Act, supra note 10.
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II. THE BIG PICTURE: OVERALL U.S. MEDIATION
LITIGATION TRENDS
A. Building Datasets and Caveats About Their Use
Both datasets14 were derived by searching for cases on
Westlaw in the “ALLSTATES” and “ALLFEDS” databases that
include the term “mediat!”. As you might imagine, this search
brings up a large number of “hits” on opinions that include some
mention of mediation (most commonly, the fact that mediation at
some point occurred before or during litigation). The number of
total hits per year on the search term has increased from 1,176 in
1999 to 5,137 in 2017 (by itself, a statistic implying considerable
increased use of mediation in American courts).
We then read each of the case “hits” to determine which opin
ions arguably involved a judicial decision on some disputed media
tion issue. Only those cases are included in the datasets.15
Admittedly, we made judgment calls about inclusion. For example,
we excluded class action cases where the court merely acknowl
edged that a settlement resulted from mediation, but included class
action cases where the court explicitly cited the fact the case was
14 The datasets are searchable Excel files, which can be viewed at the Mediation Case Law
Project website I maintain at Mitchell Hamline School of Law (https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/
dri_mcldata/). Cross-tab functions within the Excel program (available as “Filter” options in the
Excel “Data” toolbar) allow you to quickly tailor searches and combine variables (e.g., generate
a list of state supreme court decisions where a mediated settlement was enforced despite an
allegation of mutual mistake; or create a list of federal trial court decisions in a specific year
where a judge enforced a contractual obligation to mediate). Both datasets capture case infor
mation such as citation, year, jurisdiction, and level of court. Both datasets also identify the
subject matter of the mediation disputing (e.g., enforcement, confidentiality, sanctions, duty to
mediate, etc.). With respect to enforcement, the primary focus of this article, both datasets cap
ture with specificity the nature of enforcement issues or defenses presented and their resolution
(i.e., agreement enforced, not enforced, remanded, or modified or decided on other grounds).
Due to time and workload limitations, the newer dataset has slightly fewer case variables. Also,
unlike the initial dataset, the 2013–2017 compilation is organized by chapter sub-section of ME
DIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE, the mediation treatise I co-author for Thomson Reuters.
See COLE ET AL., supra note 11. The revised organizational structure, while making it slightly
more difficult to compare and contrast results between the datasets, greatly facilitates our work
with annual treatise updates. I encourage researchers to use the datasets and ask only in return
that you attribute them to me and Professor Thompson in any published work.
15 It is important to keep in mind that some lawsuits involved multiple reported opinions.
Because we wanted to study the extent to which mediation issues were being litigated and ad
dressed by the courts, we treated each opinion involving a mediation issue as a separate entry.
Consequently, the total number of opinions/entries is greater than the number of lawsuits. More
over, a significant percentage of the cases involve more than one disputed mediation issue.
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mediated as a reason to approve the mediated settlement.16 We
included cases where the court referred to a “mediation” process
involving a judge or court personnel unless we could clearly deter
mine from the opinion text that the “neutral” did not act as a medi
ator. Conversely, we excluded cases the court labeled as judicial
settlement conferences.17
There are several caveats about the datasets. First, we discov
ered that Westlaw continuously adds (and in some circumstances
deletes) cases to its databases many months after case decisions
occur. Our final cut-off date for the 1999–2003 dataset was January
31, 2005. The cut-off date for the 2013–2017 dataset varied slightly
from year to year but usually was in May or June of the following
year. Westlaw searches after these dates may likely reveal some
additional cases and perhaps delete some we originally captured.
Given the total number of potential dataset hits in these two fiveyear periods (23,812),18 I readily acknowledge our review process
may not have succeeded in reporting every single case deciding a
disputed mediation topic. Suffice it to say, we tried our best to be
consistent in our inclusion/exclusion decisions.
Second, case opinions published on Westlaw by no means cap
ture the full range of disputing in American courts. In many juris
dictions, jurists have discretion regarding which cases to publish.
While a steadily increasing number of federal trial court decisions
are on Westlaw, far fewer state court trial decisions make it into
the online database. Presumably, a huge number of mediation dis
putes of all types are resolved at the trial court level with unre
ported decisions that are not appealed by any party to the dispute.
Accordingly, it is quite possible that the big picture trends I report
here could differ considerably from the reality of work in nation’s
courthouses.
Third, even for those judicial decisions published on Westlaw,
readers know only the facts about the case that a judicial author
decided to include in the opinion to support the ultimate ruling on
16 See, e.g., Gallucci v. Gonzales, 603 Fed. Appx. 533, 534 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that the
court’s conclusion that party bargaining occurred without collusion “is bolstered by the fact that
the settlement was negotiated with the aid of a retired magistrate judge and experienced media
tor, who reported no evidence of collusion”). See also infra notes 50–61 and accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., Cornell v. Delco Elecs. Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1117 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (address
ing an agreement arrived at in a “settlement conference” where the Magistrate Judge acted as a
“go-between during negotiations.”).
18 Over the entire seventeen years, “hits” on the search term yielded 63,078 opinions (which
might partially explain why I am disinclined to create any future datasets on this particular
topic)!
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the merits. The legally relevant facts from the court’s perspective
may vary considerably from the parties’ (or mediator’s) perspec
tive on what actually transpired during a mediation.
Fourth, the trends reported here, which arguably can be char
acterized as the maturation of mediation litigation over two de
cades of institutionalization, might not, in the end, be at all
predictive of the experience of other countries and disputing cul
tures. That, of course, remains to be seen.

B. Raw Numbers
The number of judicial opinions actually deciding a disputed
mediation issue has risen from 172 in 1999 to 891 in 2017, as illus
trated in Tables 1 and 2. That more than five-fold increase in dis
puting has occurred over a time period when civil filings in U.S.
federal and state courts have been more or less constant,19 or dur
ing the 2008 recession, in decline.20 The increase in cases was par
ticularly steep in the 1999–2006 timeframe, with growth steady but
at a slower rate in more recent years. The total relevant number of
opinions, 11,216 over nineteen years, might seem insignificant on a
national scale, especially when it seems safe to assume the total
number of mediations throughout the country has increased sub
stantially over the same time period. Unfortunately, since many
mediations are private matters, it is virtually impossible to deter
mine with any accuracy the total number of mediations conducted
in the United States on an annual basis. Even court-annexed medi
ations are difficult to quantify because court programs vary dra
19 For example, according to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, new civil case
filings in the federal district courts numbered 260,271 in 1999: see Judicial Business 1999, US
COURTS.GOV, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-1999 (last visited Apr.
10, 2019); declined to 252,962 in 2003: see Judicial Business 2003, USCOURTS.GOV, https://
www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2003 (last visited Apr. 10, 2019); increased
to 267,257 five years later in 2008: see Judicial Business 2008, USCOURTS.GOV, https://
www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2008 (last visited Apr. 10, 2019); rose again
in 2013 to 284,604: see Judicial Business 2013, USCOURTS.GOV, https://www.uscourts.gov/statis
tics-reports/judicial-business-2013 (last visited Apr. 10, 2019); and in 2017 declined to 267,769:
see Judicial Business 2017, USCOURTS.GOV, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial
business-2017 (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
20 See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, TOTAL INCOMING CIVIL CASES IN STATE
COURT TRIALS, 2007–2016, http://www.courtstatistics.org/NCSC-Analysis/Civil/Civil-Caseloads
2016.aspx (last visited Mar. 13, 2019) (documenting 16% decline in civil filings between 2007 and
2016).
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matically from state to state, and there is no single source of
national data for use of mediation.21

TABLE 1: NUMBER

OF

MEDIATION CASES PER YEAR, 1999–2017
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STATE COURTS: 1999-2017
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One particularly interesting trend in the data is the shift from
a majority of mediation disputes coming from state courts (true
from 1999–2006) to a majority coming from federal courts (com
mencing in 2007 and continuing to the current day). This increase
is most likely attributable to the 2005 Congressional enactment of
the Class Action Fairness Act,22 designed to “federalize” class ac
tions.23 Indeed, according to a 2008 report of the Federal Judicial
Center, federal class action diversity filings increased nearly three

21 Even in the more unified federal court system, ADR data has been hard to come by. Just
by way of example, it was not until 2018 that the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts specif
ically referenced the extent of federal courts’ use of ADR in its annual report of court business.
See U.S. District Courts—Judicial Business 2018, USCOURTS.GOV, https://www.uscourts.gov/sta
tistics-reports/us-district-courts-judicial-business-2018 (last visited Apr. 10, 2019) (noting that
“56 districts operated ADR programs of some form, and 53 of these districts provided mediation
or judge-hosted settlement conferences. More than 25,500 civil cases were included in ADR
programs.”).
22 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (now codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)).
23 See generally Patricia Hatamyar Moore, Confronting the Myth of “State Court Class Action
Abuses” Through an Understanding of Heuristics and a Plea for More Statistics, 82 UMKC L.
REV. 133 (2013) (describing CAFA goals and providing a detailed critique of the “mythology” of
state class action abuses so routinely cited in support of the Act).
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fold in 2006–2007.24 As described in more detail in Part III, this
increase in federal court caseload has in turn significantly increased
the number of mediation disputes in the datasets, given the degree
to which federal judges now routinely invoke the involvement of a
private mediator as evidence that bargaining in a class action case
was conducted at arms-length and without collusion between the
parties.25

TABLE 2: NUMBER

MEDIATION CASES PER YEAR, 1999–2017
DETAILED CASE COUNTS

OF

Year Federal Cases State Cases Total Cases
63
109
172
1999
70
129
200
2000
76
139
215
2001
96
209
301
2002
88
248
335
2003
143
332
475
2004
218
303
523
2005
325
352
677
2006
359
250
609
2007
353
292
645
2008
316
277
593
2009
458
311
769
2010
377
271
648
2011
449
286
735
2012
441
351
792
2013
543
317
860
2014
570
295
865
2015
580
331
911
2016
600
291
891
2017

24 EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE IMPACT OF THE
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 ON THE FEDERAL COURTS: FOURTH INTERIM REPORT TO
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 6–9 (2008).
25 See infra notes 50–61 and accompanying text. I have written extensively about this phe
nomenon elsewhere, believing it to be an unjustifiable form of judicial deference to the opinions
of class action mediators. See Coben, Creating a 21st Century Oligarchy, supra note 10; Coben,
Barnacles, Aristocracy and Truth Denial, supra note 10, at 790–95.
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For the balance of this article, I will focus on two five-year
time periods: 1999–2003 and 2013–2017. Why? First, while I
tracked the total number of mediation cases throughout the
nineteen-year period, I systematically coded case details only in
twelve of those years (including the two five-periods). Second,
comparing two five-year periods a decade apart strikes me as an
effective way to evaluate big picture trends in disputing.26
As illustrated in Table 3, there were 1,223 reported opinions
involving significant mediation issues in the 1999–2003 five-year
period. The number of opinions increased from 172 in 1999 to 335
in 2003, reflecting a 95% increase. State court opinions constituted
68% of the overall total, and more than doubled in number over
five years. Federal court opinions constituted just 32% of the over
all total, with the number of opinions issued each year remaining
relatively constant over the five-year period.
TABLE 3: NUMBER

OF

MEDIATION CASES PER YEAR
5-YEAR PERIOD

Mediation Cases Per Year
1999-2003

IN

EACH

Mediation Cases Per Year
2013-2017
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4319 792 860 865 911 891
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1588
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Quite a different picture emerges a decade later. While the
total number of cases significantly increased (from 1,223 in
1999–2003 to 4,319 in 2013–2017), the pace in annual increases
over the five-year period slowed substantially. In 2013, courts is
sued opinions about mediation disputes 792 times; in 2017, there
26 For detailed reporting on the two years (2004 and 2005) left out of this comparison, see
Coben & Thompson, Mediation Litigation Trends, supra note 9.

2019] SINGAPORE CONVENTION REFERENCE BOOK 1073
were 881 decisions, an overall caseload increase of just 12.5%.
State court opinions constituted just 37% of the overall total and
declined in number from 351 in 2013 to 291 in 2017. Federal court
opinions constituted 63% of the overall total, with the number of
federal court opinions increasing each year, from 441 in 2013 to 600
in 2017.

C. Disputed Mediation Issues
As illustrated in Tables 4 and 5, the disputes about mediation
are quite diverse. Disputes about enforcement of mediated settle
ments constituted close to half of all mediation disputing in
1999–2003.27 That percentage dropped to 39% in 2013–2017. In
both five-year periods, disputes about fees and costs of mediation28
were the second largest category of mediation litigation: 20% of all
disputed cases in 1999–2003; 13% of all disputed cases in
2013–2017.
In 1999–2003, the third most frequent dispute was about court
power to compel mediation,29 occurring in 13% of the cases, fol
lowed by confidentiality disputes,30 which occurred in 12% of the
cases. Sanctions were a topic of disputing 10% of the time,31 as
was condition precedent, most commonly whether a statutory or
contract obligation to mediate before litigation or arbitration was
satisfied.32 Ethics issues, including both alleged failures of
mediators and judicial officers adjudicating mediated cases oc
27

For detailed analysis, see Part III infra, notes 46–72 and accompanying text.
For a detailed analysis of mediation fee and cost cases, see COLE ET AL., supra note 11,
§§ 9:17–9:20. See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 112–19.
29 For a detailed analysis of cases addressing court power to compel mediation, see COLE ET
AL., supra note 11, § 9:2 (noting “[s]uccessful challenges to judicially compelled mediation are
rare.”). See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 105–08.
30 Confidentiality disputes were wide-ranging, including among many other things: applica
bility of evidentiary exclusions and privilege law, waiver of privilege, discovery challenges, limi
tations on mediator reports, public right of access, court sanction for wrongful disclosure, as well
as complex choice of law problems. For a detailed analysis of mediation confidentiality law, see
COLE ET AL., supra note 11, §§ 8:1–8:49. See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 57–73.
31 For a detailed analysis of sanctions cases, see COLE ET AL., supra note 11, §§ 9:3–9:16. See
also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 119–23.
32 For a detailed analysis of condition precedent cases, see COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 6:4.
See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 105 (“[c]ollectively, the . . . opinions support a
simple principle: courts are inclined to order mediation on their own initiative, and will generally
enforce a pre-existing obligation to participate in mediation, whether the obligation was judi
cially created, mandated by statute or stipulated in the parties’ pre-dispute contract.”).
28
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curred in 6% of the cases.33 Procedural implications of a mediation
request or participation constituted 4% of the disputing,34 followed
by lawyer malpractice at 3%,35 and other acts and omissions as the
basis for independent claims at 2%.36

TABLE 4: DISPUTED MEDIATION ISSUE
(DETAILED BREAKDOWN)37
1999–2003
(1223 total cases)
569
47%
243
20%
157
13%
152
12%
123
10%
117
10%
68
6%
50
4%
31
20

3%
2%

6

1%

DISPUTED ISSUE
Enforcement
Fees/Costs
Court Power to Compel Mediation
Confidentiality
Condition Precedent
Sanctions
Ethics (Judicial and Mediator)
Procedural Implications of
Mediation Request or Participation
Lawyer Malpractice
Act or Omission as Basis for
Independent Claims
Arbitration-Mediation Waiver

2013–2017
(4319 total cases)
1668
39%
566
13%
238
6%
358
8%
404
9%
172
4%
96
2%
498
12%
65
207

2%
5%

59

1%

By 2013–2017 the relative frequency of disputed issues shifted
in some interesting ways. Most relevant to the Singapore Conven
33 For a detailed analysis of ethics cases involving judicial officers, see COLE ET AL., supra
note 11, § 10:16. For detailed analysis of ethical claims against mediators, see COLE ET AL., supra
note 11, §§ 10:5–10:14. See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 95–105.
34 See COLE ET AL., supra note 11, §§ 5:12–5:16, where my treatise co-authors and I have
grouped this wide array of case disputing into four broad categories: 1) cases raising tolling,
laches, and failure to prosecute issues (§ 5:13); 2) cases where parties used mediation participa
tion (or failure to participate) to influence litigation timelines and/or excuse rule violations
(§ 5:14); 3) cases where mediation was used to establish waiver of rights, notice of claims, and
exhaustion of administrative remedies (§ 5:15); and 4) cases where mediation participation im
pacted jurisdiction, venue, and transfer issues (§ 5:16).
35 For a detailed analysis of lawyer malpractice issues, see COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 12:4.
See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 90–94.
36 For a detailed analysis of acts and omissions leading to other claims, see COLE ET AL.,
supra note 11, §§ 15:17–15:19. See also Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 90–94.
37 The total number of issues raised exceeds the number of total cases because opinions
often address more than a single disputed mediation issue.
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tion, the percentage of cases raising enforcement issues declined
17% (from 47% of all cases in 1999–2003, down to 39% in
2013–2017).38 Disputes about confidentiality also showed marked
decline, down 33%;39 as did fee/cost disputes, down 35%;40 dis
putes about court power to compel mediation, down 54%;41 dis
putes about sanctions, down 60%;42 and disputes raising ethical
concerns about mediators or the judges deciding disputed media
tion issues, down 66%.43
The frequency of disputing about enforcing statutory or con
tractual obligations to mediate before litigation or arbitration re
mained more or less constant, with the issue being litigated in 10%
of the cases in 1999–2003 and 9% of the cases in 2013–2017.44 The
same pattern held for disputes alleging waiver of arbitration rights
by virtue of mediation participation, with the issue addressed in
1% of the cases in both five-year periods.
The growth area in mediation litigation are disputes about
procedural implications of mediation request or participation.
These disputes have increased three-fold, increasing from 4% of all
cases in the 1999–2003 dataset to 12% of the cases in 2013–2017.45
Cases alleging acts or omissions in mediation as a basis for new
38 And, as detailed infra at notes 62–72 and accompanying text, the percentage of those
enforcement cases raising “traditional” enforcement defenses (such as whether there was a
meeting of the minds or mutual or unilateral mistake, as well as challenges to fundamental fair
ness of the process through fraud or duress) declined even more.
39 Confidentiality disputes were raised in 12% of all cases in 1999–2003 but only 8% of cases
in 2013–2017.
40 Attorney’s fees and mediation costs were raised in 20% of all cases in 1999–2003 but only
13% of cases in 2013–2017.
41 Dispute about court power to compel mediation were raised in 13% of all cases in
1999–2003 but only 6% of cases in 2013–2017.
42 Sanctions disputes were raised in 10% of all cases in 1999–2003 but only 4% of cases in
2013–2017.
43 Ethics issues were raised in 6% of all cases in 1999–2003 but only 2% of cases in
2013–2017.
44 However, it should be noted that in this time period more than a third of the 404 cases
(156 or 39%) came from a single state—Nevada, and involved that state’s foreclosure mediation
statute. Without the disputing attributed to this single statute, the frequency of disputing about
statutory obligations to mediate would have been closer to 6% of all cases, rather than 9%.
45 As I wrote in the Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution in 2015, “[r]oughly a decade ago,
I first began to joke that it might be possible for me to teach my first year civil procedure course
using only case law decisions about disputed mediation issues. That is no longer a hypothetical.”
Coben, Barnacles, Aristocracy and Truth Denial, supra note 10, at 783 (following up the observa
tion with a long list of case citations and parentheticals detailing disputes about mediation rais
ing issues addressing, among other things, subject matter jurisdiction, venue, transfer, service of
process, attachment, choice of law, discovery relevance, work-product, failure to state a claim,
waiver of defenses, joinder, summary judgment, dismissals, appeals, and res judicata).
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claims also have become more common, rising from just 2% of all
cases in 1999–2003 to 5% of all cases in 2013–2017.
TABLE 5: DISPUTED MEDIATION ISSUE
0
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Enforcement
Attorney’s Fees/Mediation Costs
Court Power to Compel
Confidentiality
Condition Precedent
Sanctions
Ethics (Mediator and Judicial)
Procedural Implications of Mediation
Lawyer Malpractice
Acts or Omissions as Basis of New Claims
Arbitration/Mediation Waiver
1999-2003 Cases (percentage frequency)

2013-2017 Cases (percentage frequency)

Given that the Singapore Convention focuses exclusively on
enforcement of mediated settlements, the next section explores in
detail the data relevant to that topic.
III. DISPUTING MEDIATION SETTLEMENT ENFORCEMENT
U.S. FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS

IN

A. Types of Enforcement Disputes
As a threshold matter, it is helpful to divide enforcement dis
putes into three distinct categories. First, a considerable amount of
litigation (29% in the 1999–2003 dataset; 23% in the 2013–2017
dataset) are disputes about interpretation and/or alleged breach of
mediated settlements.46 This is distinct from cases where a party
46 See, e.g., Lester v. Percudani, 511 Fed. Appx. 174 (3d Cir. 2013) (interpreting the scope of
a release); Reilly v. Carpenter, No. 14–1260, 2015 WL 6143382, *4 (W. Va. Oct. 16, 2015) (con
cluding that failure of both parties to timely perform the “contingencies” found in their medi
ated settlement agreement did not preclude the trial court’s conclusion that the agreement was
binding and enforceable); Butler v. Caldwell, No. 48931-3-I, 622 WL 554952, at *3–4 (Wash. Ct.
App. Apr. 15, 2002) (determining that a delivery of an appraisal by fax started the three day
period for rejection set forth in the mediated settlement agreement); Caswell v. Anderson, 527
S.E.2d 582, 584 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (interpreting clause in mediated settlement agreement set
ting forth compensation for withdrawing partner).
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raises a defense to settlement enforcement, the topic specifically
addressed in Article 5 of the Singapore Convention.47 Enforce
ment defenses, discussed in more detail below,48 were raised in
65% of the cases in the 1999–2003 dataset, but only in 37% of the
cases in the 2013–2017 dataset—a 43% reduction in disputing
about defenses. Finally, a third category of enforcement cases in
the datasets involve class action litigation or other contexts where
courts exercise settlement approval authority, such as settlements
on behalf of minors or Fair Labor Standards Act disputes, where
the relevant statute requires judicial approval. Here, there is a dra
matic change in case counts between the datasets, with virtually all
the increase attributable to class action litigation. In 1999–2003,
just 34 (31 federal and 3 state) or 6% of the enforcement cases
involved judicial approval of class actions or other contexts de
manding judicial approval of mediated settlements. In the more
recent dataset, 2013–2017, there are 601 class action cases (595 fed
eral and 6 state) constituting 36% of all enforcement disputes.49
That is a rather remarkable six-fold increase in frequency, worth
just a bit of explication here, despite the fact that the Singapore
Convention excludes from its scope settlements, like court-ap
proved class action settlements, that are enforceable as
judgments.50

47

Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 5 (Grounds for Refusing to Grant Relief).
See Part III.B, infra notes 62–72 and accompanying text.
49 The balance of 661 cases in this category are predominantly Fair Labor Standards Act
cases, where courts approved mediated settlements and specifically referenced the mediation
effort as an indicia of fairness. There were also in this category a handful of minor settlement
approval cases.
50 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(3)(a). See generally Timothy Schnabel, The
Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Framework for the Cross-Border Recognition and En
forcement of Mediated Settlements, 19 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 25–27 (2019).
48
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TABLE 6: TYPE

OF

ENFORCEMENT DISPUTE

1999-2003 Enforcement Cases
(569 cases total)

2013-2017 Enforcement Cases
(1668 cases total)

Interpretation and Breach (29%) 165 cases

Interpretation and Breach (23%) 387 cases

Enforcement Defense (65%) 372 cases

Enforcement Defense (37%) 620 cases

Class Action (or other settlements requiring
judicial approval) (6%) 34 cases

Class Action (or other settlements requiring
judicial approval) (40%) 661 cases

In the vast majority of civil disputes resolved by mediation in
the United States, the parties’ settlement ends any ongoing litiga
tion without judicial review or approval of the settlement agree
ment.51 Most typically, the underlying lawsuit (assuming there was
one) is dismissed with prejudice, and the parties’ mediated settle
ment agreement is a new contract that, if breached, becomes the
subject of an entirely new legal proceeding—a contract action for
enforcement or breach.52 Class action settlements, in contrast, fol
low a different path to finality. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(e) mandates that class actions may be settled “only with court
approval.”53 While the precise factors vary from federal circuit to
federal circuit, the general objective of court review is to protect
class members “whose rights may not have been given due regard
by the negotiation parties.”54 As I have documented elsewhere in
51

See Coben, Creating a 21st Century Oligarchy, supra note 10, at 163. See generally COLE
supra note 11, § 7:19 nn.50–51 and accompanying text.
52 Id.
53 FED R. CIV. P. 23(e) (providing that “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class
may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.”).
54 Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of San Francisco, 688 F.2d 615, 624 (9th Cir.
1982) (noting that “[t]he class action device, while capable of the fair and efficient adjudication
of a large number of claims, is also susceptible to abuse and carries with it certain inherent
structural risks.”).

ET AL.,
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great detail,55 judges increasingly discharge this oversight duty by
invoking mediation evidence, all the more so in federal courts since
the 2005 passage of the Class Action Fairness Act.56 Specifically,
judges cite the involvement of a private mediator as evidence that
bargaining in a class action case was conducted at arms-length and
without collusion between the parties.57 Courts not only cite medi
ator testimony on process fairness, they often go further to recite
and credit mediator evidence on substantive merits of the very set
tlement the mediator brokered,58 a development that has always
55

Coben, Barnacles, Aristocracy and Truth Denial, supra note 10, at 790–93; Coben, Creat
ing a 21st Century Oligarchy, supra note 10, at 167–74. See also COLE ET AL., supra note 11,
§ 7:17 nn.24–34 and accompanying text.
56 See supra notes 37–39.
57 See, e.g., Jones v. Singing River Health Servs. Found., 865 F.3d 285, 295–96 (5th Cir. 2017),
cert. denied sub nom. Almond v. Singing River Health Sys., 138 S. Ct. 1000, 200 L. Ed. 2d 252
(2018) (concluding that “objectors failed to show that, even if a conflict of interest existed, the
settlement negotiations themselves were unfair or collusive” where “[t]o the contrary, the dis
trict court relied heavily on the fact that a well-recognized neutral mediator oversaw settlement
negotiations of the federal cases to ensure they were conducted at arms’ length”); In re Fab
Universal Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 148 F. Supp. 3d 277, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (stating that
“[t]he Proposed Settlement was the product of extensive formal mediation aided by a neutral
JAMS mediator, hallmarks of a non-collusive, arm’s-length settlement process”); ABF Freight
Systems, Inc. v. U.S., Nos. C 10–05188 SI, 11–04663, 2013 WL 3244804 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2013)
(citing the fact that the agreement was reached in mediation with a neutral mediator as evidence
that there was no collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct connected with obtaining the settlement);
In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 965 F.Supp.2d 369, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (observing that “[f]rom
his front row seat, the mediator concluded that “negotiations in this case were hard fought and at
arm’s-length at all times”); In re LivingSocial Mktg. and Sales Practice Litig., 298 F.R.D. 1, 11
(D. D.C. 2013) (reciting mediator testimony that “[t]here was never any type of collusion be
tween the Parties in any of the negotiations,” and that the parties’ negotiations “were intense at
every step of the way, and the Parties vigorously advocated for their respective positions”). For
historical documentation of this practice and many more case citations and parentheticals, see
supra note 55.
58 See, e.g., In re MGM Mirage Sec. Litig., 708 F. App’x 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2017) (emphasiz
ing that “the parties reached a settlement after extensive negotiations before a nationally recog
nized mediator, retired U.S. District Judge Layn R. Phillips” and “the district court properly
relied on Judge Phillips’s declaration stating that the settlement ‘represent[ed] a well-reasoned
and sound resolution of highly uncertain litigation’ and was ‘the product of vigorous and inde
pendent advocacy and arm’s-length negotiation conducted in good faith.’ ”); Johansson-Dohr
mann v. CBR Sys., Inc., No. 12-cv-1115-MMA (BGS), 2013 WL 3864341, *8 (S.D. Cal. July 24,
2013) (citing mediator testimony that “the settlement reached between the parties was the prod
uct of arm’s-length and good faith negotiations . . .” [and] “is non-collusive, fair and reasonable
to all parties and provides significant benefits to the Settlement Class.”) (emphasis added); In re
Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 297 F.Supp.2d 503, 509–10 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing
mediator testimony that “it is my opinion that the [S]ettlement[s] w[ere] achieved through a fair
and reasonable process and [are] in the best interest of the class . . . the court system and the
mediation process worked exactly as they are supposed to work at their best; a consensual resolu
tion was achieved based on full information and honest negotiation between well-represented and
evenly balanced parties”) (emphasis added).
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struck me as a particularly unwarranted judicial abdication of
power, not to mention the posing of a rather obvious conflict of
interest.59
Only a very small minority of judicial officers have resisted the
trend, most notably the Honorable William Alsup, who in Kakani
v. Oracle Corp.,60 rejected the parties’ joint motion for preliminary
approval of a mediated class action settlement, and pointedly
opined:
[i]t is . . . no answer to say that a private mediator helped frame
the proposal. Such a mediator is paid to help the immediate
parties reach a deal. Mediators do not adjudicate the merits.
They are masters in the art of what is negotiable. It matters
little to the mediator whether a deal is collusive as long as a deal
is reached. Such a mediator has no fiduciary duty to anyone,
much less those not at the table.61

B. Defenses to Enforcement
1. Overall Enforcement Rates
While the relative frequency of enforcement defense disputes
has declined, as shown in Table 7 below, the likelihood that a set
tlement will be enforced in the face of an alleged contract defense
has increased from 57% of the time to 69%.

59

See Coben, Barnacles, Aristocracy, and Truth Denial, supra note 10, at 175–87.
Kakani v. Oracle Corp., No. C 06-06493 WHA, 2007 WL 2221073 (N.D. Cal. June 19,
2007). See also In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 948 (9th Cir. 2011)
(observing that “the mere presence of a neutral mediator, though a factor weighing in favor of a
finding of non-collusiveness, is not on its own dispositive of whether the end product is a fair,
adequate, and reasonable settlement agreement”); Martin v. Cargill, Inc., 295 F.R.D. 380, 86
Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1593 (D. Minn. 2013) (stating that applying the presumption that a settlement
reached through mediation was an arm’s length, fair settlement was highly doubtful where no
formal discovery had taken place and the nature of any informal exchange of information was
not presented to the court); Lusby v. Gamestop, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 400, 413 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
(expressing a concern when the mediation was conducted privately and not subject to court
oversight).
61 Kakani v. Oracle Corp., 2007 WL 2221073, *11.
60

2019] SINGAPORE CONVENTION REFERENCE BOOK 1081
TABLE 7: HOW OFTEN SETTLEMENTS ENFORCED WHEN
DEFENSE RAISED (AS PERCENTAGE)
ENFORCEMENT RATE (AS PERCENTAGE)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Enforced

Not Enforced
1999-2003

1999–2003 (372 cases)
Number Percentage
of Cases of Cases
210
57%
77
21%
47
13%
38
10%

Remanded

Modified

2013-2017

DISPOSITION

Enforced
Not Enforced
Remanded
Modified or decided
on other grounds

2013–2017 (620 cases)
Number Percentage
of Cases of Cases
426
69%
118
19%
50
8%
26
4%

2. Specific Enforcement Defenses: Frequency and Success Rates
Table 8 shows the frequency of particular defenses in each
dataset. In 1999–2003, the six most common defenses raised—
those adjudicated in 10% or more of the enforcement cases—were
(in declining order of frequency): no meeting of minds; lack of for
mality;62 fraud; mistake (mutual or unilateral); agreement to agree;
and duress.
62

Lack of formality includes such things as lack of a required writing or signature, or failure
to include statutorily required language. See, e.g., Haghighi v. Russian-American Broadcasting
Co., 173 F.3d 1086, 1087–88 (8th Cir. 1999); Haghighi v. Russian-American Broadcasting Co.,
945 F. Supp. 1233, 1234–35 (D. Minn. 1996), certified question answered, 577 N.W.2d 927 (Minn.
1998), rev’d, 173 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 1999) (refusing to enforce an otherwise fair mediation
agreement signed by the parties that stated it was a “Full and Final Mutual Release of All
Claims” but did not include the magic words required by relevant state statute that the parties
intended the agreement to be binding). See generally James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson,
The Haghighi Trilogy and the Minnesota Civil Mediation Act: Exposing a Phantom Menace Cast
ing a Pall Over the Development of ADR in Minnesota, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 299, 324
(1999) (arguing that the insistence on technical terms in mediated settlement agreements con

1082CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION[Vol. 20:1063
TABLE 8: ENFORCEMENT DEFENSE FREQUENCY
1999–2003 (372 opinions)

2013–2017 (620 opinions)
Enforcement Defense Number of
Opinions

78

Percentage of Total
Enforcement
Opinions63
21%

78

Percentage of Total
Enforcement
Opinions64
13%

62

17%

Lack of Formality

76

12%

54

15%

Fraud

63

10%

52

14%

Mistake

43

7%

47

12%

Agreement to Agree

38

6%

36

10%

Duress

65

10%

20

5%

Attorney Lack of
Authority

36

6%

17

5%

Mediator Misconduct

16

3%

15

4%

Procedural/
Jurisdictional
Challenges

148

24%

13

3%

Public Policy

26

4%

12

3%

Undue Influence

6

1%

11

3%

Unconscionability

15

2%

3

1%

Incapacity

23

4%

61

16%

Miscellaneous

69

11%

Number of
Opinions

No Meeting of Minds

In the 2013–2017 dataset, the relative frequency of many of
these “traditional” defenses declined, with procedural or jurisdic
tional challenges taking over a larger share of the overall disput
ing—24% of the cases, compared to only 4% of the cases in the
earlier dataset. This most rapidly expanding category of disputing,
which we did not even include in the original case coding question
naire in 1999–2003 because so infrequent in that time frame, in
volves such things as whether the court had jurisdiction to hear the
matter,65 whether the parties had exhausted administrative reme
trary to community expectations creates uncertainty in whether mediation settlements are en
forceable “casting a pall over the development of ADR in Minnesota”).
63 Since opinions often evaluate more than a single enforcement defense, the total exceeds
100%.
64 Id.
65 See, e.g., Melchor v. Eisen & Son Inc., No. 15CV00113 (DF), 2016 WL 3443649, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2016) (finding no independent basis for federal jurisdiction for the enforce
ment of a mediated settlement agreement where the court had not expressly retained jurisdiction
to enforce the settlement, but nonetheless granting relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) because
the court’s premature dismissal was a “mistake” removing any incentive for compliance with the
agreement); In re Paternity of S.A.M., 85 N.E.3d 879, 889 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (declaring the
trial court’s order for the parties to conduct mediation, the resulting mediated agreement grant
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dies,66 or had taken the necessary steps in the prior proceeding or
in this proceeding to raise the issue or preserve the issue for
review.67
Duress cases constituted 10% of the disputing in both
datasets. Disputing about attorney lack of authority and incapacity
increased ever so slightly, the former increasing from 5% to 6%,
the latter from 1% to 3%. Defenses based on public policy were
also slightly more common, rising for 3% of cases in 1999–2003 to
4% of cases in 2013–2017.
The overall frequency of the miscellaneous category of de
fenses—admittedly a catch-all for a wide variety of attacks on en
forcement ranging from allegations of general unfairness,68 to
assertion of “traditional” but rarely invoked contract theories,69 to
use of arguably creative but ultimately failed avenues of attack70—
fell slightly, with such cases representing 16% of all enforcement
disputes in 1999–2003 but only 13% of disputes in 2013–2017.
And what do the datasets show about success of these various
defenses? Table 9 shows how often agreements were enforced de
spite a particular defense being raised. In both datasets, defenses
ing visitation rights, and the trial court’s order approving the agreement all void ab initio because
the father lacked standing to bring the underlying paternity action).
66 See, e.g., Furlough v. Spherion Atl. Workforce, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 114, 126 (Tenn. 2013)
(holding that the plaintiff employee did not have to again exhaust administrative remedies
before petitioning the trial court to set aside his mediated worker’s compensation settlement).
67 See, e.g., Boyd v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 697 F. App’x 397, 398 (5th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that where no stipulation of dismissal had been filed and the trial court had not yet
issued a final judgment, a party’s challenge to the validity of a mediated settlement agreement
was premature); Krechuniak v. Noorzoy, 11 Cal. App. 5th 713, 726–27, 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 740,
751–52 (Ct. App. 2017) (precluding party from arguing on appeal that a mediated settlement
included an invalid penalty provision where the issue was not presented to the trial court).
68 See, e.g., Byrd v. Byrd, No. 2150124, 2016 WL 3568725, at *9 (Ala. Civ. App. July 1, 2016)
(rejecting the argument that financial hardship posed by imminent retirement made a mediated
alimony agreement inequitable); Peterson v. Peterson, 765 N.E.2d 827 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002),
rev. denied, 772 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. June 27, 2002) (rejecting theory that mediation process was so
devoid of procedural safeguards “as to deprive the husband of due process”).
69 See, e.g., Nelson v. Levy Ctr., LLC, No. CV 9:11-1184-SB-BHH, 2016 WL 1276414, at *5
(D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2016) (rejecting applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel where de
fendant failed to establish, among other things, any injury sustained in relying on alleged
promises in the agreement); Cook v. Hughston Clinic, P.C, No. 3:14-CV-296-WKW [WO], 2015
WL 6082397, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 15, 2015) (deeming both parties’ words and actions as incon
sistent with the continued existence of the settlement agreement and applying the doctrine of
rescission to find the otherwise valid and binding agreement no longer enforceable); Gray v.
Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. 62408, 2014 WL 504605 (Nev. Jan. 21, 2014) (finding ade
quate consideration to support enforcement of a mediated settlement).
70 See, e.g., Edney v. Edney, No. S.CT.CIV. 2015-0051, 2016 WL 3188938, at *3 (V.I. June 7,
2016) (confirming that a party’s misunderstanding of the law is not a valid ground to set aside a
contractual obligation).
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related to fundamental fairness of the process such as mediator
misconduct, duress, undue influence, fraud, unconscionability, and
incapacity were all rejected at a higher rate than the average for
the respective five-year period. This rejection of fairness defenses
is particularly robust in the more recent dataset. In 2013–2017,
where the overall average enforcement rate was 69%: alleging me
diator misconduct as a defense to enforcement failed 100% of the
time; unconscionability claims were rejected 93% of the time; du
ress defenses were rejected 88% of the time; incapacity claims were
rejected 87% of the time; and fraud defenses were only marginally
more successful, with an enforcement rate of 86%.
The lowest enforcement rate is where parties raised procedu
ral or jurisdictional arguments. In 1999–2003, such defenses were
rejected outright only 33% of the time, with an additional 27% of
the cases being remanded for additional proceedings. In
2013–2017, procedural/jurisdictional arguments continued to be the
most successful attacks on mediated settlements, with an enforce
ment rate of just 53%, well below the 69% average rate. And as in
1999–2003, these defenses were also more likely than average to
result in remand (11% when compared to the average remand rate
of 8%).
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TABLE 9: HOW OFTEN AGREEMENTS ENFORCED DESPITE
DEFENSE ASSERTED
1999–2003 (372 opinions)
2013–2017 (620 opinions)
57% Overall Enforcement Rate
69% Overall Enforcement Rate
Enforcement Defense
How Often
How Often
Agreement Enforced
Agreement Enforced
Despite Defense
Despite Defense
Raised
Raised
75%
83%
Undue Influence
71%
100%
Mediator Misconduct
69%
86%
Fraud
69%
74%
Mistake
66%
87%
Incapacity
64%
88%
Duress
64%
93%
Unconscionability
60%
75%
Attorney Lack of Authority
59%
74%
Miscellaneous
57%
60%
No Meeting of Minds
55%
68%
Agreement to Agree
50%
67%
Lack of Formality
46%
69%
Public Policy
33%
Procedural/Jurisdictional Challenges 53%

3. The Enforcement-Confidentiality Connection
The common wisdom is that enforcement and confidentiality
are closely linked.71 The datasets, in contrast, suggest litigation
only relatively rarely involves both issues. As shown in Table 10,
between 1999 and 2003, courts considered both enforcement de
fenses and confidentiality challenges in thirty-eight cases (just 10%
of all enforcement defense cases in that time period).

71 See, e.g., Ellen E. Deason, Enforcement of Settlement Agreements in International Com
mercial Mediation: A New Legal Framework?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2015, at 32, 36 (noting
that “presenting evidence of contract defenses often spawns tensions with confidentiality protec
tions.”); Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-Connected Mediation—Ten
sion Between the Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of Public
Adversarial Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 509, 515 (2004) (observing that “the
penchant for confidentiality and secrecy, resulting in overlapping privilege rules, makes it diffi
cult for parties to litigate claims of unfairness in the mediation process.”).
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TABLE 10: THE ENFORCEMENT-CONFIDENTIALITY CONNECTION
1999–2003 (38 cases where a
court considered both
enforcement and
confidentiality issues) 10% of
all enforcement defense cases
Number of
Percentage
Cases
of Cases
11
29%
13
34%
7
18%
7
18%

DISPOSITION

Enforced
Not Enforced
Remanded
Modified or
decided on other
grounds

2013–2017 (29 cases where a
court considered both
enforcement and
confidentiality issues) 5% of all
enforcement defense cases
Number of
Percentage
Cases
of Cases
19
66%
8
28%
2
7%
0
0%

In the more recent 2013–2017 time period, courts grappled
with both enforcement defenses and confidentiality issues only
twenty-nine times, just 4% of all cases raising an enforcement de
fense. The sharp decline in this issue-linking is somewhat surpris
ing given that combining these issues together during the
1999–2003 time period significantly increased the likelihood that an
agreement would not be enforced. Indeed, while the overall settle
ment enforcement rate in that time period was 57%, it dropped
dramatically to 29% when parties disputed both enforcement and
confidentiality. In 2013–2017, not only did the frequency of linking
those issues substantially decline, but the dramatic differential in
enforcement rates when the issues were linked virtually disap
peared altogether (a 66% enforcement rate when linked, compared
to a 69% enforcement rate when not). Together with the overall
decline in litigation about confidentiality issues,72 these statistics
suggest that confidentiality frameworks for mediation are working
relatively efficiently and predictably for parties.
4. Significance of the Subject Matter of the Underlying Dispute
The underlying subject matter of the disputes involving en
forcement defenses has been remarkably stable. As shown in Ta
ble 11, enforcement-defense disputing in the commercial context
increased ever so slightly, from 54% of the cases in 1999–2003 to
56% of the cases in 2013–2017. Very slight increases also occurred
72

See Table 5, supra notes 27–45 and accompanying text (noting that confidentiality disputes
constituted 12% of all mediation litigation in 1999–2003, but only 8% of all mediation litigation
in 2013–2017).
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in the family law and employment contexts. Family law cases were
30% of enforcement defense cases in 1999–2003 and 31% of the
cases in 2013–2017. Employment law cases were 10% of enforce
ment defense cases in 1999–2003 and 11% of cases in 2013–2017.
In contrast, estate/probate enforcement-defense disputes declined,
dropping from 6% of all cases in 1999–2003 to only 2% in
2013–2017.

TABLE 11: SUBJECT MATTER OF CASES WHERE ENFORCEMENT
DEFENSES RAISED
1999-2003 Cases Raising an Enforcement
Defense (372 cases total)

General Civil (54%) [200 cases]
Family (30%) [112 cases]
Employment (10%) [37 cases]
Estate/Probate (6%) [23 cases]

2013-2017 Cases Raising an Enforcement
Defense (620 cases total)

General Civil (56%) [347 cases]
Family (31%) [190 cases]
Employment (11%) [69 cases]
Estate/Probate (2%) [14 cases]

Do enforcement rates vary based on subject matter context?
Table 12 shows the enforcement rates for the four categories of
cases: general civil, family, employment, and estate/probate. In the
1999–2003 dataset, the enforcement rates were virtually identical
for all four case types, with the exception that defenses raised in
the estate/probate context were slightly less likely to fail (52% en
forcement when contrasted with the overall 57% average enforce
ment rate). In the 2013–2017 dataset, employment disputes were
the most likely to be enforced despite defenses (71% enforcement
rate), with general civil and family law cases both being enforced at
a 69% rate. Once again, enforcement defenses were most success
fully adjudicated in the estate/probate context, where agreements
were enforced against challenges only 50% of the time.
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TABLE 12: ENFORCEMENT RATE BY SUBJECT MATTER
OF DISPUTING
1999–2003 (372 opinions)
2013–2017 (620 opinions)
57% Overall Enforcement Rate
69% Overall Enforcement Rate
How Often Agreement
Subject Matter of
How Often Agreement
Enforced Despite Defense
Underlying Dispute
Enforced Despite Defense
Raised
Raised
57%
69%
General Civil
56%
69%
Family
57%
71%
Employment
52%
50%
Estate/Probate

IV. EVALUATING
THE

THE SINGAPORE CONVENTION
U.S. LITIGATION EXPERIENCE

IN

LIGHT

OF

As noted above, there is certainly no guarantee that the U.S.
litigation experience with mediation will be replicated in other ju
risdictions. Nonetheless, these litigation trends provide at least
some empirical data against which to evaluate decisions, both polit
ical and practical, made by the drafters of the Singapore Conven
tion. In particular, I will focus on six things: 1) the choice to focus
on enforcement; 2) the wisdom of minimal formalities and an optout approach; 3) subject matter treaty exclusions for vulnerable
parties; 4) grounds for refusing to grant relief; 5) concerns about
mediator malfeasance; and 6) confidentiality.
A. A Sensible Focus on Enforcement
The Singapore Convention creates a legal framework for rec
ognition and enforcement of mediated settlement agreements
made in the context of international commercial business disputes.
As Timothy Schnabel, former head of the U.S. delegation to the
Convention Working Group puts it, mediated settlements qualify
ing for enforcement under the Convention will “be able to circu
late across borders in their own right, without the need to rely on
domestic contract law or being transformed into an arbitral award
on agreed terms.”73
73 Timothy Schnabel, Implementation of the Singapore Convention: Federalism, Self-Execu
tion, and Private Law Treaties, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. (forthcoming 2019), available at https://
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Why elect to focus on enforcement? Perhaps most important
is the perspective of international commercial mediation users.
Recent empirical surveys suggest strong support for a global en
forcement framework, akin to what the New York Convention ac
complished for arbitration.74 In a perfect world, since mediation is
based on consent and self-determination, one might be excused for
thinking that parties using the process would live up to their obliga
tions. But the reality is that they do not always do so, as aptly
demonstrated by the U.S. mediation litigation experience docu
mented in Part III infra, which shows that disputing about enforce
ment of mediated settlement agreements has always been the most
common issue addressed in mediation litigation.
The Convention drafters initially discussed whether to include
enforcement of agreements to mediate in addition to enforcement
of mediated settlement agreements.75 That dual-track approach
would have mirrored the New York Convention, which provides
for enforcement of agreements to arbitrate,76 as well as arbitral

ssrn.com/abstract=3320823, at 2. According to the Convention’s Preamble, the enforcement
framework will “contribute to the development of harmonious international economic rela
tions.” Singapore Convention, supra note 1, at Preamble.
74 See, e.g., S.I. Strong, Use and Perception of International Commercial Mediation and Con
ciliation: A Preliminary Report on Issues Relating to the Proposed UNCITRAL Convention on
International Commercial Mediation and Conciliation (University of Missouri School of Law Le
gal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-28, Nov. 17, 2014), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2526302 (reporting that 74% of survey respondents believe a Conven
tion on enforcement would encourage increased use of mediation and conciliation in their coun
tries, “with only 8% of respondents taking the contrary view.”). See also Schnabel, supra note
50, at 3 (noting that “UNCITRAL was presented with evidence that mediated settlements are
seen as harder to enforce internationally than domestically, which was said to disincentivize the
use of mediation to resolve disputes” and further noting that “[m]any companies find it hard to
convince their business partners in some jurisdictions to engage in mediation based on views that
it lacks a stamp of international legitimacy like the New York Convention has given to arbitra
tion since 1958.”).
75 See generally S.I. Strong, Beyond International Commercial Arbitration? The Promise of
International Commercial Mediation, 45 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 11, 32–34 (2014) (recom
mending that a Convention address enforcement of agreements to mediate and suggesting that
drafters could turn to the UNCITRAL Model Conciliation Law “for inspiration, since that in
strument includes some very good language concerning the enforcement of an agreement to
mediate as well as provisions relating to the rejection or termination of an offer to mediate”).
76 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, art. II(1) (providing that “[e]ach Con
tracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to sub
mit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter
capable of settlement by arbitration.”).
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awards.77 The drafters ultimately declined to legislate enforcement
of agreements to mediate, primarily out of concern the issue would
overcomplicate the drafting effort.78 The U.S. litigation experience
would suggest this choice should be relatively non-controversial.
As noted above in Part II(C), disputes about court power to com
pel mediation were just 6% of all cases in 2013–2017 (down from
13% in 1999–2003), while disputes about contractual or statutory
obligations to mediate were 9% of all cases in 2013–2017 (down
from 10% in 1999–2003).79 Regardless of the overall frequency of
disputing, successful challenges to court-compelled mediation are
rare,80 and courts “will generally enforce a pre-existing obligation
to participate in mediation, whether the obligation was judicially
created, mandated by statute or stipulated in the parties’ pre-dis
pute contract.”81

B. The Wisdom of Minimal Formalities and Opt-out Approach
The Singapore Convention requires only minimal formalities
as a condition of providing enforcement relief82 and permits optout from treaty coverage only by declaration83—in other words, a
default approach that generally assumes that parties want their
agreements to be enforceable. Both were wise drafting choices
that will limit the type of litigation about formalities and party in
77 Id. art. I(1) (providing that “[t]his Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforce
ment of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recogni
tion and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between persons,
whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic
awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought.”).
78 See generally Schnabel, supra note 50, at 14. See also Edna Sussman, The Singapore Con
vention: Promoting the Enforcement and Recognition of International Mediated Settlement Agree
ments, 3 ICC DISP. RESOL. BULL. 42, 49 (2018) (noting that “[w]hether or not agreements to
mediate are enforceable and whether they are considered conditions precedent that preclude the
progression to employing other dispute resolution modalities varies across jurisdictions.”); Dea
son, supra note 71, at 34 (calling it sensible to separate enforcement of settlements from enforce
ment of agreements to mediate, noting that “as a practical matter, garnering support for a less
ambitious legal instrument would probably be easier” and questioning whether enforcement is
needed to initiate mediation).
79 But see supra note 44 (emphasizing that more than a third of the condition precedent cases
in 2013–2017 addressed the foreclosure mediation statute of a single state, Nevada).
80 COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 9:2.
81 Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 105.
82 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 4.
83 Id. art. 8(1)(b).
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tention to be bound that regularly appears in the U.S. mediation
litigation datasets, both old and new.84
Under the Convention, a settlement must be signed by the
parties,85 with an authorized option for electronic signature.86 The
party seeking relief under the Convention must offer evidence that
mediation has occurred,87 including among other easy to prove op
tions, the mediator’s signature on the agreement.88 While a num
ber of delegations expressed concerns about the mediator being
the source of such evidence,89 it is a common exception to confi
dentiality in a number of U.S. statutory frameworks, including the
Uniform Mediation Act,90 which expressly authorizes a mediator
to report whether mediation occurred, as well as party attendance
and whether a settlement was reached.91 The 2005 AAA/ABA/
ACR Revised Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, the
most widely cited ethical code of conduct for mediators in the
United States, also expressly authorizes mediator reports regarding

84 See COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 7:19 (observing that “[i]ncreased formality requirements
are intended to guard against surprise and uncertainty, to protect confidentiality, and to reduce
litigation” but often end up “creat[ing] the surprise, uncertainty, and increased litigation”). See,
e.g., Haghighi v. Russian-American Broadcasting Co., 945 F. Supp. 1233, discussed supra note
62; In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 2013 WL 6326707 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding it
insufficient that the parties intended, at the time of contract formation, to be bound by the
mediated settlement terms, where their agreement did not include a statement to the effect that
their settlement was intended to be enforceable or binding).
85 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(1)(a).
86 Id. art. 4(2)(a).
87 Id. art. 4(1)(b). See Schnabel, supra note 50, at 30–31 (noting that “[t]he stated reason for
imposing this requirement was to reduce the risk of fraud and to make it easier for competent
authorities to ensure that the settlement was indeed mediated”).
88 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 4(1)(b)(i). Other options for such evidence in
clude the mediators’ separate written attestation that mediation occurred, a written statement
from the institution administering the mediation, or in the absence of those listed methods, “any
other evidence acceptable to the competent authority.” See Singapore Convention, supra note 1,
art. 4(1)(b)(ii)–(iv). For a more complete analysis of Article 4 proof, see SING. REF. BK., Allan J.
Stitt, The Singapore Convention: When has a Mediation Taken Place (Article 4)?, 20 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 1173 (2019).
89 See generally Schnabel, supra note 50, at 31–32 (noting, among other things, the concern
that mediators in some jurisdictions are trained not to sign a settlement).
90 For detailed information about the Act, including full text as adopted (with or without
reporter’s notes), superseded drafts, and legislative fact sheet, see Mediation Act, UNIFORM LAW
COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=4556
5a5f-0c57-4bba-bbab-fc7de9a59110w (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
91 See Unif. Mediation Act § 7(b)(1) (“A mediator may disclose . . . whether the mediation
occurred or has terminated, whether a settlement was reached, and attendance”). For additional
statutory and court rules addressing mediator reports, see COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 8:40.
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attendance and whether or not a settlement was reached.92 The
European Code of Conduct for Mediators likewise authorizes me
diator disclosure when “compelled by law or grounds of public pol
icy.”93 The bottom line: the Convention requirement for minimal
formality will do little to chill mediator performance, is consistent
with many jurisdictions’ existing approach to confidentiality, and
will avoid a particularly robust category of litigation—disputing
about enforcement of oral agreements94 and “magic word” require
ments like those in my home state of Minnesota95 or California.96
The Convention’s “opt-out” approach is also likely to signifi
cantly reduce overall litigation. Signing states may exercise a reser
vation right to declare that the Convention applies only if parties
have agreed to its application,97 but absent that reservation or ex
press contractual agreement of parties to negate Convention appli
cation,98 the Convention applies without the necessity of private
party contracting on the topic. This seems best aligned with the
common understanding of disputing parties.99
92 See 2005 AAA/ABA/ACR REVISED MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS
Standard V(A)(2) (permitting mediator to report “if required, whether parties appeared at a
scheduled mediation and whether or not the parties reached a resolution.”).
93 See EUROPEAN CODE OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS § 4 (“The mediator must keep con
fidential all information arising out of or in connection with the mediation, including the fact
that the mediation is to take place or has taken place, unless compelled by law or grounds of
public policy to disclose it.”).
94 COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 7:5 (cataloguing dozens of oral enforcement disputes, in
cluding seventeen state supreme court decisions).
95 Under Minnesota’s Civil Mediation Act, a mediated settlement agreement must state spe
cifically that the agreement is binding, that the parties were advised in writing that the mediator
has no duty to protect the parties’ interests or to inform them about their legal rights, that
signing the settlement agreement might adversely affect their rights, and that they should consult
with an attorney before signing or if the parties are uncertain of their rights. See Minn. Stat.
§ 572.35(1).
96 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1123 (providing that a written mediated settlement agreement can
be admissible only if the “agreement provides it is admissible,” “enforceable,” or contains
“words to that effect.”).
97 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 8(1)(b) (“A Party to the Convention may declare
that: . . . (b) It shall apply this Convention only to the extent that the parties to the settlement
agreement have agreed to the application of the Convention.”).
98 Parties who affirmatively by agreement opt-out of Convention application would satisfy
the refusal ground in Convention, art. 5(1)(d) (“granting relief would be contrary to the terms of
the settlement agreement.”).
99 See Eunice Chua, The Singapore Convention on Mediation—A Brighter Future for Asian
Dispute Resolution, ASIAN J. INT’L L. 1, 5–6 (2019) (noting that requiring affirmative opt-in
could be contrary to the expectations of the parties as they would generally expect the other
party to comply with the settlement agreement and thus its possible enforcement, citing Report
of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the Work of its Sixty-sixth Session, UNCITRAL,
UN Doc. A/CN.9/901 (2017), para. 36.); Deason, supra note 71, at 36 (noting that “[a]n opt-out
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C. Justifiable Exclusions?
The Convention applies to agreements resulting from media
tion to resolve international commercial disputes.100 Disputes aris
ing from transactions involving consumers, as well as family,
inheritance, and employment law are specifically excluded from
coverage.101 A primary motivation for these exclusions is the per
ception that in these contexts parties are more likely to be victims
of unequal bargaining power.102 As one commentator has opined,
“crafting desirable protections for relatively unsophisticated par
ties subject to adhesion agreements would overly complicate a con
vention. Furthermore, absent this exclusion, a convention would
run afoul of mandatory laws protecting such parties, which fre
quently are stronger outside the United States.”103
Does the litigation track record in the United States provide
any evidence to support the assumption that parties might be more
“at risk” when mediating in certain subject matter categories? Sur
prisingly, there is very little in the datasets to justify this concern.
framework makes sense from the perspective of maximizing use of the convention’s enforcement
mechanisms” as “[r]esearch has shown that default rules are ‘sticky,’ meaning that parties tend
not to alter them.”). That said, the opt-in, opt-out choice was hotly debated. See Schnabel, supra
note 50, at 57–59. See also Sussman, supra note 78, at 49 (summarizing the underlying policy
conundrum as offering contrasting views of self-determination and party autonomy, with one
perspective positing these prime values would be best served by convention application only
where the parties have expressly consented to be bound, whereas others emphasize the counterintuitiveness of requiring parties “to confirm their consent to enforce their obligations under a
settlement agreement.”).
100 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1) (“This Convention applies to an agreement
resulting from mediation and concluded in writing by parties to resolve a commercial dispute
(‘settlement agreement’) which, at the time of its conclusion, is international . . .”).
101 Id. art. 1(2) (“This Convention does not apply to settlement agreements: (a) concluded to
resolve a dispute arising from transactions engaged in by one of the parties (a consumer) for
personal, family, or household purposes; (b) relating to family, inheritance or employment
law.”).
102 See generally Schnabel, supra note 50, at 23–24.
103 Deason, supra note 71, at 33–34; SING. REF. BK., Ellen E. Deason, What’s in a Name? The
Terms “Commercial” and “Mediation” in the Singapore Convention on Mediation, 20 CARDOZO
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1149 (2019). See also Dorkas Quek Anderson, Supporting Party Autonomy
in the Enforcement of Cross-Border Mediated Settlement Agreements: A Brave New World or
Unchartered Territory? in MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE LUXEMBOURG SUMMER SCHOOL-INTERNA
TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF PROCEDURAL LAW SUMMER SCHOOL 2018: PRIVATIZING DISPUTE RES
OLUTION AND ITS LIMITS para. 43 (Nomos, 3d ed. 2018), available at https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3304587 (noting it is “common practice in commercial mediations to have legal repre
sentation to protect parties against any pressure exerted by the mediator. Hence, the assumption
of arms-length negotiations within contract law may not be too far from the reality in crossborder commercial mediations.”).
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As noted supra in Table 12, the percentage at which agreements in
a particular subject matter context are enforced despite an enforce
ment defense tend not to vary from the overall enforcement aver
ages. Estate/probate cases are a clear exception, with enforcement
defenses succeeding in that context at a relatively higher rate when
compared to the average (52% settlement enforcement rate in
1999–2003 dataset compared to the average rate in that time period
of 57%; 50% settlement enforcement rate in 2013–2017 dataset
compared to the average rate of 69%). On the one hand, this dis
parity might well be attributable to the vulnerability of parties in
that particular bargaining context, exactly as the Convention draft
ers feared. It is also possible, however, that the relative paucity of
estate/probate cases in the datasets simply skews the numbers.

D. Striking the Right Balance on Contract Defenses
(for the most part)
Article 5 of the Convention lays out an exclusive list of
grounds on which a court may refuse enforcement or block a
party’s ability to invoke a mediated settlement agreement in de
fense of an attempt to relitigate the underlying dispute (what many
jurisdictions would refer to as “recognition”).104 A detailed expli
cation of the grounds for refusal is beyond the scope of this short
article. Comprehensive summaries are available elsewhere, includ
ing essays published in the chapters in this Singapore Reference
Book105 The chart below authored and recently published by Edna
Sussman offers a beautifully succinct summary106:

104 For a detailed explication of the complex negotiations regarding the absence of the word
“recognition” from the Convention, see Schnabel, supra note 50, at 35–42.
105 See SING. REF. BK., Michel Kallipetis, Singapore Convention Defences Based on Media
tor’s Misconduct: Articles 5.1(e) & (f), 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1197 (2019); SING. REF.
BK., Jean-Christophe Boulet, The Singapore Convention and the Metamorphosis of Contractual
Litigation, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1209 (2019); SING. REF. BK., Héctor Flores Sentı́es,
Grounds to Refuse the Enforcement of Settlement Agreements Under the Singapore Convention
on Mediation: Purpose, Scope, and Their Importance for the Success of the Convention, 20 CAR
DOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1235 (2019). See also Schnabel, supra note 50, at 42–56.
106 Sussman, supra note 78, at 52 (noting that “[t]he grounds track many, but not all, of the
defenses available in resisting enforcement of a contract and include issues related to mediator
conduct.”).
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Substantive grounds

Incapacity of a party to the settlement agreement,107 or
Settlement agreement is null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed under the law to which the
parties have subjected it, or failing any indication, under
the law applicable by the competent authority where
relief is sought.108

Grounds relating to the
terms of the settlement
agreement

The settlement agreement is not binding, or is not final,
according to its terms,109 or
The settlement agreement has been subsequently
modified,110 or
Obligations in the settlement agreement have been
performed111 or are not clear or comprehensible,112 or
Granting relief would be contrary to the terms of the
settlement agreement.113

Grounds relating to the
mediator’s conduct and the
process

Serious breach by the mediator of standards applicable
to the mediator or the mediation without which breach
the party would not have entered into the settlement
agreement,114 or
Failure by the mediator to disclose to the parties
circumstances that raise justifiable doubts as to the
mediator’s impartiality or independence.115

Sua moto/sua sponte
grounds invokable by the
competent authority of the
Party to the Convention
where relief is sought or a
requesting party

Granting relief would be contrary to the public policy of
that Party,116 or
The subject matter of the dispute is not capable of
settlement by mediation under the law of that Party.117

During the March 2019 symposium, more than one speaker
emphasized the necessity to interpret these Convention grounds
for refusal language with particular policy objectives in mind.
Allan Stitt, the Canadian Delegate to the UNCITRAL Working
Group, offered two very helpful framing questions: 1) Who are we
trying to help? and 2) What are we protecting them from? His
answers: “We are trying to help the person who wants to enforce a
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(a).
Id. art. 5(1)(b)(i).
Id. art. 5(1)(b)(ii).
Id. art. 5(1)(b)(iii).
Id. art. 5(1)(c)(i).
Id. art. 5(1)(c)(ii).
Id. art. 5(1)(d).
Id. art. 5(1)(e).
Id. art. 5(1)(f).
Id. art. 5(2)(a).
Id. art. 5(2)(b).
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mediated settlement agreement. We are protecting that person
from the other contracting party who wants to renege on the
agreement.”118
Michal Kallipetis, the IAM Delegate to the UNCITRAL
Working Group, noted that the entire purpose of drafting the
Convention was to avoid litigation, not encourage it.119 And he
urged attendees to remain cognizant of three key words
(highlighted in bold in his impressive memorable PowerPoint
presentation) which govern all of the defenses outlined in Article 5:
1) the word “may”, which refers to the fact that all of the
grounds for refusal of relief are permissive, rather than
mandatory;120
2) the word “only”, which mandates that this permissive refusal
authority is conditioned on the party challenging enforce
ment meeting its burden of proof to establish entitlement to
a refusal ground;121 and
3) the word “proof”, which is what a party opposing enforce
ment must offer with respect to any of the grounds.122

Eric Tuchman, General Counsel for the American Arbitration
Association, reminded symposium participants to remember the
treaty’s primary promise: to give legitimacy to mediation, an ami
cable process based on consent and self-determination that in the
ory should not result in significant amounts of litigation. The
assumption that litigation would be the exception rather than the
rule came early in the Working Group deliberations, where it was
noted that “very few settlement agreements required enforcement
as most parties would abide by the terms of the settlement
agreement.”123
118 See SING. REF. BK., Allan J. Stitt, The Singapore Convention: When has a Mediation
Taken Place (Article 4)?, 20 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1173 (2019).
119 See Kallipetis, supra note 105.
120 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(1) (“The competent authority of the Party to
the Convention where relief is sought under article 4 may refuse to grant relief at the request of
the party against whom the relief is sought only if that party furnishes to the competent authority
proof that . . .) (emphasis added). In other words, a court could exercise discretion to enforce an
agreement even if a particular ground for refusal might apply.
121 Id.
122 Id. Moreover, the party challenging enforcement carries the burden of proof to establish
the ground.
123 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of
its sixty-third session (Vienna, 7-11 September 2015), U.N. Doc A/CN.9/861, at 8, para. 33 (Sept.
17, 2015). See also Quek Anderson, supra note 103, para. 42 (characterizing Article 5 as “a safety
valve to deal with instances when autonomy is compromised, but ideally one that is not fre
quently utilized.”); Schnabel, supra note 50, at 4 (“Ideally, the Convention will rarely need to be
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As the co-author of Disputing Irony124 and compiler of the
two massive mediation litigation datasets described in Part II
above, please forgive me if I take a somewhat skeptical view of the
anticipated minimal use for the “grounds for refusal.” That said,
all in all, with my U.S. litigation experience in mind, I feel like the
drafters mostly got it right.125 The grounds are certainly broad
enough to permit the wide range of “traditional” contract defenses
parties typically raise post-mediation. As documented in Part III
above, disputing about those defenses has substantially declined
over time in the United States. That may well be the pattern under
the Convention as well.
More important, the grounds for refusal are intended to fore
close defenses based on unique domestic law requirements, “such
as any requirements that mediators be licensed in a particular juris
diction or that mediations must be conducted under certain rules
or by certain institutions, or that mediated settlements must be no
tarized or meet other (extra-Convention) formal requirements.”126
The U.S. litigation experience shows that these technical formali
ties and procedural hoops have become the growth sector in the
mediation litigation industry. Cutting them off from the very be
ginning is a very wise choice.
E. Much Ado About Nothing: Overblown Concerns About
Mediator Malfeasance?
As noted in the previous section, Article 5 provides for refusal
based on mediator malfeasance.127 Specifically, Article 5(1)(e) au
thorizes discretionary refusal to grant enforcement relief if there is
proof of a serious breach by the mediator “of standards applicable
to the mediator or the mediation without which breach that party
would not have entered into the settlement agreement.”128 Article
5(1)(f) authorizes discretionary refusal to grant enforcement relief
based on proof the mediator failed “to disclose to the parties cirinvoked in court, as in most cases, parties will abide by the mediated settlements they
conclude.”).
124 Coben & Thompson, supra note 1.
125 See Part IV.E infra for an important caveat.
126 Schnabel, supra note 50, at 45.
127 Id. at 50 (characterizing these grounds for refusal as relating “less to the agreement
reached by the disputing parties than to the conduct of the third party who helped them resolve
the dispute, and the consequences of such conduct.”).
128 Singapore Convention, supra note 1, art. 5(1)(e).
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cumstances that raise justifiable doubts as to the mediator’s impar
tiality or independence” but only if “such failure to disclose had a
material impact or undue influence on a party without which fail
ure that party would not have entered into the settlement
agreement.”129
Whether to include any defenses premised on third-party con
duct was a topic of hot debate, with the compromise solution being
inclusion but only in a very narrow set of circumstances.130 As suc
cinctly summarized at the March 18, 2019 Cardozo Symposium by
speaker Michel Kallipetis,131 the Article 5(1)(e) defense premised
on mediator breach of standards is significantly cabined by the re
quirement that any alleged breach of standards be “serious” and
proven to effectively vitiate party consent—a but/for standard that
will be extremely difficult to prove in practice.132 Kallipetis also
forcefully argued that the Article 5(1)(f) defense based on failure
to make disclosures about conflicts was similarly restricted in scope
129

Id. art. 5(1)(f).
See, e.g., Sussman, supra note 78, at 49:
There was a particularly vigorous debate as to whether there should be any defenses
based on the conduct of the mediator or a mediator’s failure to make disclosures
related to independence and impartiality, since that would open the door to some of
the gamesmanship that has become problematic in the context of enforcement under
the New York Convention. Others felt that it was crucial that these grounds be in
cluded in order to ensure the fairness of the mediation process. As part of the pack
age of compromises, it was agreed that grounds related to the conduct of mediators
would be included as grounds for refusing to grant relief but that they would only
apply in narrow circumstances.
See also Chua, supra note 99, at 8 (describing the provisions as reflecting compromise in three
key ways):
First, it limits the scope of the defences to instances where the mediator’s misconduct
or failure to disclose had a direct impact on the settlement agreement in that the
“party would not have entered into the settlement agreement”. Second, it adjusts the
language of the defences to highlight the exceptional circumstances that can be
raised by using adjectives such as “serious” and “material”. Third, by having the text
accompanying the instrument, it provides an illustrative list of examples of applicable
standards. Although it would take the development of a substantial body of case-law
or other pronouncements by enforcing authorities before it can be said with any cer
tainty what types of conduct would cross the line, the words used in the defences are
sufficient to establish that the threshold should be high. Whether or not the miscon
duct of the mediator was such that a party would not have entered into the settle
ment agreement without it would be a finding of fact that courts and other enforcing
authorities are in a position to make based on available evidence.
131 Mr. Kallipetis was the International Academy of Mediators Delegate to the Convention
Working Group.
132 See also Schnabel, supra note 50, at 51–52 (highlighting, among other things, that alleged
breaches of standards must be serious, “not just questionable conduct or a minor breach,” and
the authority considering refusal cannot “apply standards on a post hoc basis (e.g., . . . cannot
deny relief based on an argument that the mediator should have followed certain best practices
or other jurisdictions’ requirements.”).
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because of the necessity that doubts about mediator impartiality/
independence be “justifiable,” and even if justifiable, would only
be actionable if those justifiable doubts had such material impact
that without the failure to disclose the party would not have en
tered the agreement.133
In short, this compromised focus on mediator behavior is in
large part likely to be entirely symbolic in practice, which is exactly
what the track record from U.S. litigation suggests (despite the fact
that the defense is not nearly as circumscribed under common law
in the United States as it is in the Convention). As Professor
Thompson and I wrote in 2006 with respect to the 1999–2003
dataset which, as noted above in Part III(B)(2), included just sev
enteen cases where parties asserted mediator misconduct as a de
fense to enforcement:
[d]espite considerable academic ink devoted to the subject of
mediator liability and ongoing debates about quasi-judicial and
statutory immunity, there is a surprising dearth of cases alleging
mediator misconduct or ethical violations. As other authors
have observed, the chance of a mediator being successfully sued
is remote. Nor is mediator misconduct commonly used as an
enforcement defense.134

In the 2013–2017 dataset, the total number of cases alleging a me
diator misconduct defense was even smaller (sixteen total), with
not a single one being successful. In other words, much ado about
nothing in a practical sense.
F. A Defensible Choice to Decline Legislating Mediation
Confidentiality
The Singapore Convention does not address confidentiality,
instead leaving this topic to be determined by applicable domestic
law.135 In the past, I have praised the merits of uniformity in confi
133 Id. at 53–54 (highlighting, among other things, that “ ‘[j]ustifiable doubts’ ” is intended to
establish an objective standard, not affected by whether the party in question subjectively doubts
the mediator’s independence and impartiality.”).
134 Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 95.
135 See Schnabel, supra note 50, at 18. While the Convention is silent on confidentiality, the
newly approved UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and Interna
tional Settlement Agreements Resulting From Mediation (2018) expressly authorizes disclosure
of mediation information “for the purposes of implementation or enforcement of a settlement
agreement.” See Article 10 Confidentiality (“Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, all informa
tion relating to the mediation proceedings shall be kept confidential, except where disclosure is
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dentiality regulation,136 and specifically endorsed the Uniform Me
diation Act (“UMA”) as a statutory framework where reasonable
exceptions to confidentiality permit parties to sensibly litigate
about enforcement disputes.137 That said, getting global agreement
on a single approach to this complex topic (which depending on
jurisdiction and legal culture might involve statutes, court rules, ju
dicial decisions, ethical codes, ADR institutional provider policies,
and/or party contract) would likely take many more years of nego
tiation than the three the Singapore drafters devoted to the Con
vention. Indeed, the drafting history of the UMA in the United
States was a case study in the difficulty of herding cats, which in the
end has resulted in adoption of the end product in only twelve U.S.
jurisdictions.138
Moreover, the U.S. litigation data suggests that confidentiality,
an issue that impacts many aspects of mediation litigation beyond
just enforcement, may be far less critical in the context of enforce
ment disputes than one might assume. Indeed, in our 2006 report
on the 1999–2003 dataset, Professor Thompson and I highlighted a
surprising phenomenon:
The large volume of opinions in which courts considered de
tailed evidence of what transpired in mediations without a confi
required under the law or for the purposes of implementation or enforcement of a settlement
agreement.”). U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Report of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade
Law, Fifty-first session, U.N. Doc. A/73/, annex II (2018) (emphasis added). This confidentiality
provision, albeit renumbered and with the word “mediation” replacing the word “conciliation,”
is identical to Article 9 of the 2002 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Con
ciliation. See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on Its
Thirty-Fifth Session, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 17, annex 1, at 54, U.N. Doc. A/57/17
(2002). See also Draft Guide to Enactment and Use of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Interna
tional Commercial Conciliation, U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, 35th Sess., at 1,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/514 (2002) (noting that “[a]lthough the Working Group that prepared the
Model Law initially considered including a list of specific exceptions, it was strongly felt that
listing exceptions in the text of the Model Law might raise difficult questions of interpretation, in
particular as to whether the list should be regarded as exhaustive.”).
136 See Coben, My Change of Mind on the Uniform Mediation Act, supra note 10.
137 Id. See also COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 8:15 (detailing the rather limited litigation his
tory for the Uniform Mediation Act, now adopted in twelve U.S. jurisdictions) and § 8:28 (de
tailing the litigation perils of California’s more absolute approach to mediation confidentiality
protection).
138 See generally COLE ET AL., supra note 11, § 8:13 and multiple secondary sources cited
therein (noting that negotiating the Act’s confidentiality provisions “proved to be the most con
tentious part of the Act because many interested commentators had strong but conflicting beliefs
about the need for confidentiality in mediation and the tension among privacy, fairness and
access to the courts” and that “[d]rafting was also difficult because over 250 state mediation
privilege statutes existed at the time the UMA was drafted and mediators from those states
sometimes advocated for their state’s statute.”).
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dentiality issue being raised—either by the parties, or sua sponte
by the court. Indeed, uncontested mediation disclosures oc
curred in thirty percent of all decisions in the database, cutting
across jurisdiction, level of court, underlying subject matter, and
litigated mediation issues. Included are forty-five opinions in
which mediators offered testimony, sixty-five opinions where
others offered evidence about mediators’ statements or actions,
and 266 opinions where parties or lawyers offered evidence of
their own mediation communications and conduct—all without
objection or comment. In sum, the walls of the mediation room
are remarkably transparent.139

I did not code the 2013–2017 dataset with equal specificity regard
ing source of disclosure and whether disclosure occurred without
objection or comment. But as detailed above in Table 12, in the
more recent 2013–2017 dataset, litigating parties only relatively
rarely joined enforcement and confidentiality issues in the same
dispute. Indeed, parties joined those two issues in enforcement de
fense cases only 5% of the time. And even when the issues were
joined, the enforcement rate changed only marginally.140
V. CONCLUSION
If the U.S. mediation litigation experience tells us anything, it
is that disputing about mediation is an inevitable part of institu
tionalization of the mediation process. As statutes, rules, and other
regulations are created and applied, lawyers inevitably learn to ex
ploit the rules universe on behalf of their clients. That said, with
institutionalization has also come evolution in disputing trends.
Perhaps most relevant to the Singapore Convention effort, the U.S.
litigation experience suggests that party disputing about enforce
ment will decline over time, especially challenges to mediation set
tlement enforcement based on contract formation or fairness
concerns. In that respect, the drafters might take comfort in the
hope that the primary goal of the Convention—to promote the use
of mediation and confidence in its use—will in fact be its primary
legacy, as opposed to ramping up the global count of mediation
enforcement disputes.
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Coben & Thompson, supra note 2, at 58–59.
In cases where parties disputed both confidentiality and an enforcement defense, the over
all enforcement rate dropped from 66%, as opposed to 69% when enforcement defenses were
raised without also litigating confidentiality.
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